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Of the three Asian crisis economies that went under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s 
stewardship, only Thailand has experienced a populist backlash. This study explores why the country 
opted for populism in the 2001 general election. It shows that absolute poverty was responsible for the 
rise of Thaksin’s populism. In more detail, the so-called Thaksin fever was strongly correlated to the 
region’s post-crisis poverty level, excepting the southern region. This study also tentatively concludes 
that, even though political variables such as political deinstitutionalization do not explain the 
establishment of a populist government, they still may explain its absence. 
 





A newly founded “populist” party scored a landslide victory against the coalition 
government led by neoliberalist Chuan Leekpai in the 2001 general election in Thailand. 
Such outright victory of “populism” was a big surprise considering that the country had thus 
far played the role of an internationally renowned model student of neoliberalism since 
receiving emergency rescue loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 
1997 Asian economic crisis. Prior to the event, neoliberalism championed by the IMF had 
not encountered any serious challenge from policymakers in Thailand and other crisis-hit 
Asian countries. In other words, neoliberalism had been considered to be the only game in 
town in Asian crisis economies, rapidly taking over the Asian growth model (World Bank 
1993) that had previously been highly touted.   
This study explores why Thailand’s neoliberal reform eventually experienced a sudden 
“populist” backlash. Before introducing what I call a populist program, this paper first 
provides a brief summary of the extraordinary election results of 2001, which created a 
majority party in parliament for the first time in Thai democracy’s modern history. 
Considering the various, opposing, and even negative meanings of populism (Taggart 2000; 
Conniff 1999; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991b), it subsequently presents the features of 
Thailand’s populism as an alternative economic policy regime that contends seriously with 
neoliberalism. 1  This section will help avoid unnecessary misunderstandings about the 
                                                 
 This work was supported by the faculty research fund of Konkuk University in 2004. Earlier versions 
of this study were presented at the conference on “Asian Political Economy in an Era of 
Globalization,” Dartmouth College in May 2002, and also at the third Korean-Thai Political 
Scientists’ Dialogue at Sailom Hotel, Hua Hin, Thailand in July 2003. The author thanks, among 
others, David Kang, John Gerring, Amara Pongsapich, Jung Bock Lee, Yong Ho Kim, Thitinan 
Pongsudhirak and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
1 This study does not deny that a particular government in reality may implement both neoliberal and 
populist programs. Once elected, a populist might also introduce some neoliberal policies, even if his 
populist policy platform has helped put him in office. This is especially true in the age of 
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otherwise quite controversial term. This is followed by successive discussion of two 
alternative explanations for the rise of Thailand’s populism, both of which draw on the Latin 




2. LANDSLIDE VICTORY OF POPULISM: THE 2001 GENERAL ELECTION 
 
Thaksin Shinawatra and his populist party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT), scored a landslide 
victory in the January 2001 general election. Of the 500 parliamentary seats, the newly 
founded TRT won 248. In contrast, the Democrat Party (DP), which led the coalition 
government and also was the only time-honored party in volatile Thai politics, gained only 
128 (Table 1). The sudden rise of the new TRT was a remarkable event, considering that one 
of the 23 TRT cofounders projected at its foundation that it would be a mid-size party 
winning 20 or 30 seats in the election (Nation 7/15/1998). The party had indeed remained out 
of public sight until September 1999 when Thaksin barely beat Chuan in an opinion poll for 
Prime Ministership conducted by the Bangkok University’s Krungthep Poll Research Center 
among people in Bangkok and nearby (Bangkok Post 9/14/1999). 
In the election, Thai voters were given two ballots for the first time according to a newly 
institutionalized electoral system: one for parties under proportional representation (PR) in a 
single nationwide constituency, and the other for individual candidates under single-member 
simple plurality rule. As a consequence, there were two different election results. Regardless 
of electoral rules, however, the TRT obtained a virtual majority of parliamentary seats. Thus, 
the party became the first party that had ever broken Thailand’s long-established tradition of 
partisan proliferation and fragmentation, which had so far resulted in democratic instability.  
 
 
Table 1.  Results of Thailand’s January 2001 General Election 
 
Source: Alpha Research Company (1999), Bangkok Post (2/2/2001), Associated Press 
Newswires (2/2/2001). 
                                                                                                                              
neoliberalism. In this study, Thaksin is characterized as populist in that he advocated the three key 
economic programs in Section 3 that set him apart from Chuan.   
 January 2001 
November 1996 
District PR 
TRT 200 48 - 
Seritham 14 0 4 
New Aspiration 28 8 125 
Chart Thai 35 6 39 
Chart Pattana 22 7 52 
Democrat Party 97 31 123 
Social Action 1 0 20 
Thai Motherland 1 0 - 
Others 0 0 30 
Total 400 100 393 





3. NEOLIBERALISM VERSUS POPULISM: CONTENDING POLICY PACKAGES 
 
The sudden victory of the TRT is due, not exclusively but largely, to its appealing 
populist platform. Notwithstanding charges that Thaksin and his party played money politics 
by buying votes and luring candidates from other parties by irresistible financial offers, the 
election was certainly the first time that Thai political parties had ever appealed to voters 
with contradictory policy packages, namely, populism and neoliberalism. One might argue 
that the populist platform was not the only factor in the election that played a determinate 
role in the voters’ choice; for instance, Thaksin’s personality and wealth also played a certain 
role in the TRT’s victory. One might also question the credibility of Thaksin’s challenge to 
neoliberalism by arguing that the billionaire and business tycoon is a neoliberalist in disguise 
of a populist. However, the huge lead of TRT over the DP would be difficult to explain 
without reference to the TRT’s populist platform. Even though the Democrats questioned the 
feasibility of Thaksin’s populist programs, which they believed would worsen the already 
deteriorating budget deficit, they could not prevent a strong populist backlash against 
neoliberalism. 
Thaksin’s so-called national populism aims to redefine Thailand’s economic 
development regime. It has emerged as an antithesis to Chuan’s earlier neoliberalism. These 
two development paradigms are different from each other in the following three key aspects. 
First, the Chuan government embraced globalization and its concomitants such as 
liberalization, smaller government, and free market, without much hesitation. It believed that 
the prime source of post-crisis development finance should be foreign investment, and it also 
considered exports as the prime engine that should drive economic growth. For this purpose, 
it made great efforts to regain foreign investors’ confidence. In contrast, Thaksin’s populism 
is a relatively more inward-oriented economic development regime, which he believes will 
make his country less vulnerable to abrupt changes in the international business environment. 
It is not so enthusiastic about hosting foreign investment and promoting exports as the pre-
crisis developmental state model or Chuan’s neoliberalism. Even though it still prefers to 
leave Thai economy open to foreign investment as before, it wants to put greater emphasis 
on boosting domestic demand and prefers to phase out export-driven economic growth. 
According to Thaksin, “Past governments worked inside-out. This must change to become 
outside-in where society’s needs are implemented and addressed by the state” (Bangkok Post 
1/30/2001). 
Second, embracing a trickle-down theory, the Chuan government focused its policies on 
strengthening the modern economy sector, especially, the financial sector, as opposed to 
agriculture. It was willing to spend billions of baht to buttress the crumbling banking system, 
but was reluctant to provide subsidies for the rural economy. According to Wibullak 
Ruamrak, chief of the Trade Negotiation Department at the Commerce Ministry of Chuan’s 
cabinet, “Subsidies are like narcotics which only make them [farmers] addicted” (Bangkok 
Post 2/20/2000). On the other hand, in national populism, the agricultural sector, as opposed 
to the modern sector including the financial sector, has a high policy priority. “It’s like the 
Chinese proverb. If one farmer dies, then 100 merchants will die” (Bangkok Post 1/30/2001). 
Rehabilitation of the farming sector is also in line with the more inward-oriented approach to 
economic development, because the sector has low import contents and is considered less 
vulnerable to external factors. For a similar reason, national populism gives more weight to 
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small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), believing that the failure of some SMEs would 
cause less damage to the whole economy, unlike big-business failures. 
Finally, Chuan’s neoliberalism aspired to dismantle the pre-crisis developmental state 
model in which the state under the control of corrupt politicians played a key role in the 
economy together with some fourty to fifty Chinese-Thai families that controlled nearly the 
whole modern economy ranging from banking through manufacturing to services (Nation 
5/18/2000). In a similar way, the Chuan government preferred market-driven corporate and 
banking restructuring in which the government’s direct intervention remained minimal. The 
government’s primary role was defined as providing regulatory and other legal-institutional 
frameworks for the market. For instance, the government rejected any idea of creating a 
national or centralized asset management corporation that would nationalize non-performing 
loans (NPLs). It instead encouraged banks to take care of their bad assets by establishing 
their own private asset management companies, even though the NPLs of already closed 
banks and finance companies were inevitably transferred to a government-supported asset 
management company. 
In contrast to Chuan’s market-oriented policy regime, Thaksin’s populism calls for a 
more active role of the state in helping the two economic sectors, agriculture and SMEs, 
which were given a low priority in the earlier discourses of globalization and neoliberalism. 
In detail, it has propounded, among others, three key state policies: a debt moratorium for 
farmers, village investment funds, and a centralized national asset management company.  
First, Thaksin and his party proposed a three-year moratorium on interest repayments on 
farmers’ loans borrowed from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC), which was in turn funded mostly by foreign loans. Second, village investment 
funds, with the support of a one-tambon-one-product campaign, were designed to create 
small- and medium-size local enterprises as well as help out rural areas. In detail, the TRT 
promised a one million baht loan to every village that could come up with a viable plan to 
use the funds. Priority would go to SME projects utilizing local raw materials and knowledge. 
Finally, a Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC) would be set up to buy bad loans from 
the banking system with a total face value of 1.3 trillion bath (Nation 6/22/2001). The 
previous private asset management company approach did not help to restructure the SMEs’ 
bad loans, which accounted for 40 percent of the NPLs in the financial system that peaked at 
about 2.7 trillion baht, more than 45 percent of the total loans (Bangkok Post 9/1/1999).  
In sum, the Chuan government’s neoliberal development regime pursued an outward-
oriented, foreign capital-funded, export-driven, and modern-sector-based growth regime, 
with the agricultural and public sectors playing marginal roles (Jarvis 2001). In contrast, 
Thaksin’s populism holds a quite different idea about what course of post-crisis economic 
development to take, with a view to developing a more-balanced, inward-oriented and 
domestic demand-based economy. 
 
 
4. POLITICAL EXPLANATION FOR POPULISM 
 
In this and next section we account for the sudden rise of populism in Thailand. The 
conventional wisdom is that populism is attributed to poverty, inequality and distributive 
conflict (Sachs 1989; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991b). Disagreeing with this conventional 
explanation for populism, a recent theory of liberal populism makes an attempt to separate 
the concept of populism from any specific model of economic development. According to 




liberal populism, populism is not an antithesis to neoliberalism, as in this study, but may be 
“compatible with and complementary to neoliberal reforms in certain contexts” (Roberts 
1995: 83). It is rather a mode of clientelistic political mobilization by personalist leaders 
when institutionalized forms of political representation break down amid social and 
economic upheavals. Thus, “it is the failure of representative institutions like political parties, 
labor unions, and autonomous social organizations to mediate between citizens and the state 
that paves the way for the direct, personalist mobilization of heterogeneous masses which is 
synonymous with populism” (Roberts 1995: 113). 
The key hypothesis of liberal populism is that political deinstitutionalization, which is a 
consequence of neoliberal adjustments and economic crises, leads to populism. This political 
interpretation of populism is inapplicable to the case of Thailand. A major problem with it is 
that the country does not have any history of strong political institutions. Before the crisis, 
Thai political parties remained very volatile from election to election, and there was no 
coherent political cleavage or issue agenda over which political parties were divided over 
time (Samudvanija 1995: 347). Leftist political parties and politically powerful organized 
labor unions were virtually unseen in the country. Instead, clientelism was a dominant mode 
of interaction between political leaders and citizens before the crisis. In other words, like 
most other Asian democracies, political institutions were chronically weak in pre-crisis 
Thailand. This means that no meaningful process of political deinstitutionalization could 
follow the economic crisis and neoliberal adjustments in Thailand. Rather, it turned out that 
the crisis made social organizations such as the Assembly of the Poor and the P-Net, a 
private election watchdog, more vocal. For instance, the Assembly of the Poor openly 
launched a campaign to vote down the Democrat Party during the election campaign period, 
even though it did not endorse any particular party.  
Earlier at the onset of the economic crisis, social organizations, with the support of the 
military, successfully drove hesitant old parliamentarians to ratify a reform constitution. The 
new constitution was designed with a specific view to establishing political stability and 
cleaning up patron-client networks that corrupt politicians had run (Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand 1997). Even though the new constitution by itself would be insufficient 
to get rid of the widespread practice of pork barreling, it definitely would have the effect of 
curbing down such practice. It stipulates that ministers shall not be concurrently senators or 
house representatives, and that they shall not hold a position in any sort of commercial 
enterprise or shall not be a shareholder of any business except to a certain legal limit. When 
House representatives defect or are dismissed from their parties, they no longer keep their 
House membership. To run for the House, prospective candidates should be members of a 
single political party for a consecutive period of no less than 90 days. These clauses, along 
with introduction of a single-member district system, are also expected to have the effect of 
reducing partisan fragmentation, and, consequently, strengthening Thailand’s notoriously 
weak political party system. This is especially true when the PR component has a 5 percent 
threshold.  
To summarize, the economic crisis and the subsequent neoliberal adjustments did not 
weaken social organizations or civil society in Thailand. On the contrary, the civil society, 
i.e., dense network of social organizations, was rejuvenated in the course of weathering the 
crisis. A major political contribution by the economic crisis was institutionalization of the 
new rules of the game, which would have the ultimate effect of strengthening the previously 
fragile political party system. In other words, we do not observe political 
deinstitutionalization in post-crisis Thailand, but we rather notice that the traditional patron-
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client networks have been weakened, even if not eliminated, in the wake of the economic 
crisis. Notwithstanding the strengthening of political institutions especially, the political 
party system, a populist government was put in place in Thailand, which contradicts the 
hypothesis of liberal populism.2 
 
5. ECONOMIC EXPLANATION FOR POPULISM 
The previous section has argued that to the contrary of liberal populism, political 
deinstitutionalization did not account for the sudden rise of populism in Thailand. This 
section will show that the conventional wisdom linking poverty to populism better explains 
the 2001 event in Thailand, but with a slight modification. In particular, it puts forward a 
hypothesis that absolute poverty indeed accounted for the outright victory of the TRT and its 
populist policy package. The analysis of poverty here will rely on sub-national (cross-
regional) comparison within Thailand instead of cross-country analysis. The reason for 
employing the cross-regional approach is that we have comparable cross-regional data about 
absolute poverty within Thailand, while absolute poverty in terms of national poverty 
incidence is not strictly comparable across countries. 
One might say that if we use relative poverty indicators such as Gini coefficient and 
income ratio, we can engage in cross-country comparison of poverty. This is true, but the 
analysis here does not employ this research strategy either. The reason for this is that there 
was no significant post-crisis change in income disparity in Thailand, even though there 
existed some meaningful decrease in relative poverty in Indonesia and a dramatic upsurge in 
income inequality in South Korea in the wake of the economic crisis (World Bank 2000: 
115-6).3 Hence, this study analyzes cross-regional variation in absolute poverty within post-
crisis Thailand. 
Meanwhile, to measure the extent of populist appeals at the regional level, this study uses 
a proxy variable, that is, the TRT’s lead in PR votes over the DP. More precisely, this 
variable represents the TRT’s vote percentage in a region’s total valid PR votes deducted by 
the DP’s share in the same region. This proxy variable is designed to serve four functions. 
First, by using PR or party-list voting outcomes, it will control for candidates’ individual 
characteristics, varying from constituency to constituency. Second, it will also control, to 
some extent, for the quite contentious factor in the election, that is, corruption: despite a 
general contagion between PR and district voting in a mixed electoral system, it is certain 
that PR voting was less exposed to money politics such as direct vote buying and local 
godfathers’ monetary or other influences in Thailand. This was exactly what the Thai 
constitutional designers had in mind when introducing the PR component in the new 
electoral system. Third, the proxy variable counts on seats but on votes for political parties.  
This is intended to control for the disturbing effect of electoral systems in converting votes 
into seats. Finally, to eliminate the influence or interference of other political parties, which 
                                                 
2 Even though the rules of the game in the constitution contributed to Thaksin’s electoral victory, his 
political life was also once seriously threatened by the newly established National Counter Corruption 
Commission’s charge that he made a false asset declaration. 
3 For more information about cross-country poverty levels, see Asian Development Bank (2000, 2001a, 
2001b). 




was of little relevance to the competition between populism and neoliberalism, the variable 
focuses exclusively on votes for the TRT and the DP.  
With regard to absolute poverty in Thailand, of the 6.8 million Thais living under the 
national poverty line in 1996, “1.25 million were in the North, 3.97 million were in the 
Northeast, 0.66 million in the Central Plains, 0.9 million in the South, 0.02 million in 
Bangkok, and 0.02 million in surrounding areas” (Bangkok Post 4/21/1998). This means that 
the respective regional poverty rates in 1996 were as follows: 10.4 % in the North, 19 % in 
Northeast, 6.3 % in the Central Plains, 11.5 % in the South, 0.4 % in Bangkok, and 0.6 % in 
its vicinity.   
After the economic crisis, 3.1 million new poor were created nationwide in 1999 
(Bangkok Post 8/1/2000). The largest increases were in the Northeast and South, followed by 
the Central. The poverty rates rather dropped in the most urbanized areas, Bangkok and its 
vicinity. The North’s poverty rate did not change much. In other words, the already poor 
areas except the North became poorer after the crisis (Table 2).4  
 
Table 2.  Poverty Indicators at the Regional Level in Thailand 
     
   Gini Poverty Incidence (%) 
1996 2000 1996 1999 
Greater Bangkok 0.38 0.36 0.6 0.2 
Central 0.35 0.36 6.3 7.5 
North 0.39 0.39 11.2 (10.4) 10.6 
Northeast 0.39 0.40 19.4 (19.0) 30.8 
South 0.37 0.38 11.5 15.7 
Note: Greater Bangkok includes Bangkok’s vicinity, and the figures in parentheses are my own 
calculations based on the above Bangkok Post report and the official population data.  
Source: Natenuj (2001); the National Statistical Office, http://www.nso.go.th 
 
Also note that, regardless of regions, rural areas experienced a sharp increase in the 
poverty incidence. “The crisis has contributed to a sharp increase in the incidence of poverty 
both in villages and sanitary districts [as opposed to municipal areas]. In villages [in 
particular], crisis has highly increased the poverty by 48.5 and 109.2 percent in 1998 and 
1999. Poverty incidence in village areas stood as high as 21.5 percent of total population in 
rural areas” (Natenuj 2001: 13). This explains why the national urban center recorded the 
lowest poverty rate in the table. An explanation for this strange phenomenon considering the 
largely urban and financial nature of the Asian economic crisis is found in the Nation 
(1/4/2000). 
 
Before the crisis, farmers got their income in two roughly equal parts, one part from 
agriculture, the other from sending off their sons and daughters to work in the city. In the first 
year of the crisis, the second part disappeared. The sons and daughters lost their jobs and 
stopped sending money home. In the second year, the first part shrank because crop prices 
                                                 
4  Economic inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient underwent little change or increased by a 
negligible margin in all areas except Greater Bangkok, where it rather decreased notably. Hence, it 
obviously cannot account for the victory of Thaksin’s populism. 
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fell, and the sons and daughters came back home to share in the family rice bowl. Urban 
Thailand survived the social disruption of this crisis because two or three million people left. 
This transferred the impact away to the villages, where it is not so visible but just as hurtful. 
 
Given Thailand’s above-mentioned regional poverty situations, I find that poverty was 
indeed an important factor behind the so-called Thaksin fever in the 2001 parliamentary 
election. Aside from the South, which is the apparently perpetual stronghold of the DP, 
Figure 1 shows that regional absolute poverty was correlated closely to the above-mentioned 
proxy variable. The national urban center, Bangkok, which, as noted above, had the lowest 
poverty rate and did not experience a significant increase in the poverty after the crisis, was 
least affected by the Thaksin fever. On the other hand, the Northeast, which displayed the 
greatest poverty rate and at the same time experienced the greatest increase in the poverty 
after the crisis, showed the greatest lead of the TRT over the DP. It is worth noting that the 
North, Thaksin’s home region, was not the place where the TRT entertained the greatest lead 
over the DP, despite the TRT campaign of “Prime Minister from the North.” Even though the 
poverty rate in the North remained high compared to other regions, the crisis did not change 
its poverty incidence as much as in the South, Northeast or Central.  
 

















TRT's lead over DP 
Absolute poverty 
 
Note: The election results were downloaded from the Department of Local Administration, 
http://www.dola.go.th after the second round of elections on January 29, 2001.  
 
Interestingly enough, the South remained virtually immune to the Thaksin fever. First, 
the DP led over the TRT by a great margin in the region, while the opposite was the case 




with the other regions. Second, the DP’s performance in Songkhla, that is, the most turbulent 
area in the South over a Malaysia-Thailand gas pipeline project in the run-up to the election, 
was not really any different than in other southern provinces at all.5 Finally, the TRT won 
only one out of the 54 southern district seats in the 2001 election, even though Thaksin’s old 
party, Palang Dharma, used to win three out of the 45 contested seats in the region in the 
1992 parliamentary election.   
It is difficult to explain the exceptional preference for the DP in the South with just 
economic circumstances. The region had the second highest poverty rate next to the 
Northeast before the crisis, and it also experienced one of the largest increases in the poverty 
rate during the crisis. In other words, it was one of the regions in which the poverty situation 
deteriorated after the crisis. Regional income and debt levels also cannot properly account 
for the DP’s exceptional performance in the South (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Average Monthly Income and Debt per Capita by Region in Thailand (baht) 
 
 Income Change  
(%) 
Debt 
1996 2000 2000 
Nation 2,933 3,380 15.2 18,247 
Greater Bangkok 6,896 7,716 11.9 34,503 
Central 3,000 3,800 26.7 19,159 
North 2,423 2,544   5.0 16,841 
Northeast 1,581 2,014 27.4 13,135 
South  2,533 3,002 18.5 15,330 
Note: 2000 figures are preliminary. 
Sources: http://www.nso.go.th and National Statistics Office (1999: 143) 
 
Rather, an apparently unwavering regional attachment to the DP, which congealed over 
time except a few provinces of the Muslim-dominant Deep South, is more likely to explain 
the party’s exceptional performance in the South. This requires further research for 
verification. Yet, if this is true, it has an important theoretical implication for populism: even 
if political variables fail to explain the rise of populism in Thailand, as discussed in the 
previous section, a solid political cleavage structure may explain the absence of populism. In 
other words, political parties founded on solid political cleavages can block a populist 





Of the three Asian economies that went under the IMF’s stewardship during the regional 
economic crisis (namely, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea), only Thailand has 
experienced a strong populist backlash. This study has explored why the country turned its 
economic development course from neoliberalism to populism in early 2001. It has first 
found that the instance of Thaksin’s populism does not support the idea of liberal populism, 
which is a recent political interpretation of populism in the Latin American literature. Unlike 
                                                 
5 For conflicts over the project, see various issues of Nation or Bangkok Post in October 2000. 
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the conventional economic interpretation of populism, liberal populism attributes the rise of 
populism to political deinstitutionalization and personalization of authority. Thaksin’s 
populism, however, arose in new political circumstances in which Thailand’s rampant 
political patronage system was weakening, its notoriously fragile political party system was 
undergoing de-fragmentation, and its social organizations including non-government 
organizations were becoming more assertive.    
Second, this study, drawing on a sub-national comparison, has shown that absolute 
poverty was responsible for the rise of Thaksin’s populism. In more detail, by analyzing the 
post-crisis election results, it has found that the so-called Thaksin fever, measured with the 
TRT’s electoral lead over the DP at the regional level, was correlated strongly to the post-
crisis regional poverty level, except in the southern region. This finding turns out to be in 
favor of the conventional wisdom that often links populism to poverty and economic 
inequalities, even if this study has put greater emphasis on absolute poverty.  
Finally, this study has tentatively conjectured that, even though political variables such as 
political deinstitutionalization do not explain the establishment of a populist government, 
they still may explain its absence. It has implied that political variables, especially, a solid 
political cleavage structure, can block the sudden rise of populism in democratic elections. In 
other words, even when there exist favorable economic conditions for the rise of populism, 
populism will not prevail in democratic elections if there are effective political barriers that 
block its advance at the beginning. This phenomenon is seen in the South of Thailand, the 
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